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THE COURT OF APPEALS AT THE COCKTAIL PARTY: THE
USE AND MISUSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
JACK SCHWARTZ*
AMANDA STAKEM CONN**
Judge Harold Leventhal described the use of legislative
history as "the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail
party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's
friends."'
INTRODUCTION
In 1984 this law review published a rarity: an article that directly
produced a change in the behavior ofjudges.2 In that article, Melvin
J. Sykes, a leading appellate practitioner, challenged the Maryland
Court of Appeals to abandon its use of the canons of statutory con-
struction and instead explain honestly why the court construed a stat-
ute in a particular way:
Courts must come to grips directly with their relationship to
legislatures. It will not help to solve these problems by con-
cealing them with fictions compounded of equal parts of hy-
perbole and hypocrisy. Repetition of confusing and
meaningless tenets of construction cannot help but under-
mine confidence in the judicial process. The Court of Ap-
peals should turn instead to the task of explaining more
* B.A., University of Maryland Baltimore County, 1972; J.D., Yale University, 1975.
Mr. Schwartz is an Assistant Attorney General and Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice
in the Maryland Attorney General's Office.
** BA., University of Maryland College Park, 1988; J.D. candidate, University of Balti-
more, 1995. Ms. Conn formerly was a law clerk in the Opinions and Advice Division of the
Maryland Attorney General's Office. The authors are grateful to David lannucci, Mary
Lunden, Jane Nishida, Robert Roth, Michael Volk, Kimberly Smith Ward, and Robert
Zarnoch for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. The views expressed in this
Article are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Attorney General's
Office.
1. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). Judge Leventhal's remark also is quoted in part in Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv.
195, 214 (1983).
2. Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposal For a Change in Maryland's Statutes Quo, 43 MD. L.
REv. 647 (1984).
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forthrightly its reasons for adopting a particular construction
in an individual case.3
To the astonishment and delight of many observers, the Court of
Appeals heeded this admonition. In Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore,4
the court, citing the Sykes article, implicitly acknowledged the truth of
his indictment that courts often misuse canons of construction to ra-
tionalize their results, rather than explaining the actual reasoning that
produced those results.5 While the court declined Sykes's suggestion
that it abandon its use of canons of construction altogether, it did
announce its intention to "apply the canons.., and at the same time
attempt to give forthright explanations for the result we reach."6
But Kaczorowski did more than that. It identified the court's task
as discovering the intended result of the legislative process:7
3. Id. at 667; see also Karl N. LIewellyn, Remarks on the Theoy of AppeUate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. Rxv. 395, 401-06 (1950)
(observing that the canons of construction have a certain Newtonian character for every
canon, one can find an equal and opposite canon); see generally KARL N. LuwEiYN, THE
COMMON LAw TRADnION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960). Judge Posner, though calling
Llewellyn's criticism "an exaggeration," also has noted defects in the canons of statutory
interpretation:
[B]ut what is true is that there is a canon to support every possible result. If a
judge wants to interpret a statute broadly, he does not mention the plain mean-
ing rule; he intones the rule that remedial statutes are to be construed broadly, or
some other canon that leads toward the broad rather than the narrow. If he
wants to interpret the statute narrowly, he will invoke some other canon.
RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRisIs AND REFORM 276 (1985). The main vice
of the canons, then, is the one Sykes identified: use of the canons masks the actual reason-
ing process by which a court reaches its result.
4. 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).
5. Id. at 512, 525 A.2d at 631. Judge William Adkins, the author of Kaczorowski, had
foreshadowed this view while serving on the Court of Special Appeals. See Christian v.
State, 62 Md. App. 296, 303 n.4, 489 A.2d 64, 67 n.4 (1985) (citing Sykes, supra note 2, at
647, but stating that judges "are constrained to follow and to attempt to apply the rules as
they now exist").
6. Katzorowski, 309 Md. at 512, 525 A.2d at 631; cf. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the
Treasury, Income Tax Div., 313 Md. 118, 145, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988) ("[I]n Maryland
we do not engage in [the] mindless application of canons of statutory construction.").
Mindlessly or not, the Court of Appeals occasionally invokes one or another of the tradi-
tional canons. See, e.g., Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 437, 639 A.2d 675, 679 (1994)
(strict construction of penal statutes); In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 634 A.2d 53 (1993)
(ejusdem generis); Thanos v. State, 332 Md. 511,525, 632 A.2d 768, 774 (1993) (avoidance of
absurd results); cf. Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 458, 545 A.2d 1312, 1319
(1988) (using legislative history to overcome canon that specific statutory provisions gov-
em over general ones).
7. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 538-39 (1947) ("Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an
inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government.").
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However fictional the notion of institutional intent may
sometimes be, it is fair to say that legislation usually has some
objective, goal, or purpose. It seeks to remedy some evil, to
advance some interest, to attain some end. If we characterize
the search for legislative intent as an effort to "seek to dis-
cern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the
statute," we state the concept more accurately and avoid the
fiction.'
Thus, an understanding of the words in the statute is necessary but
not always sufficient, because the text is merely the skin of something
deeper: the General Assembly's "'purpose, aim, or policy."' 9
To be sure, the text is still primary: "Of course, in our efforts to
discover purpose, aim, or policy we look at the words of the stat-
ute .... [W]hat the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a
goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal."1" The
Court of Appeals has never claimed, as the United States Supreme
Court once implied, that it need not look at the text if the legislative
history is clear."
As the "ingredient" metaphor suggests, however, statutory con-
struction in the Court of Appeals often includes more than considera-
tion of the statutory text alone. A one-ingredient meal is boring. The
other ingredients of the analysis are what the court labeled "context":
When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are
not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in
the Annotated Code. We may and often must consider other
"external manifestations" or "persuasive evidence," including
a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that oc-
curred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to
earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that
fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose
or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the
particular language before us in a given case. 12
8. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632 (citations omitted) (quoting Sykes,
supra note 2, at 653).
9. Id. (quoting Sykes, supra note 2, at 653).
10. Id.
11. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971)
(because of ambiguity in the legislative history, "we must look primarily to the statutes
themselves to find the legislative intent"). Thus did the Supreme Court make law of what
had been but a scholarly flippancy. See Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 543 ("Spurious use of
legislative history must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only
when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute.").
12. Kaaorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (quoting Frankfurter, supra note
7, at 539 ("external manifestations") and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) ("persua-
sive evidence")).
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When the court spoke of "other material that fairly bears on the fun-
damental issue of legislative purpose or goal,"'8 it opened the door to
an examination of anything and everything in a statute's legislative
history.
In the post-Kaczorowski era of statutory construction, we know
where the Court of Appeals starts: with "the words of the statute, giv-
ing them their ordinary and natural import."1 4 We also know where
the court wants to end: with a construction that is reasonable in light
of "the purpose, aim, or policies of the Legislature reflected in the
statute."15 En route, the court adduces "evidence of the Legislature's
intent ... from a statute's 'relationship to earlier and subsequent leg-
islation.'"' 6 The court also "look[s] to the context surrounding the
enactment of a statute to determine the intention of the legislature."' 7
In our view, the court set off in the right direction in Kaczorowski.
Given the nature of the General Assembly as a part-time citizen-legisla-
ture, the court must be realistic about the frailties of the process.' 8
Textual uncertainty sometimes results from a decision by the General
Assembly to avoid answering an apparent question, perhaps because a
struggle over the answer would doom the bill. Most often, however,
the uncertainty regarding the application of statutory text results from
the simple failure to foresee a question:
The most important reason why statutes are so frequently
ambiguous in application is not that they are poorly
drafted-though many are-and not that the legislators
failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the
statute-though often they do fail-but that a statute neces-
sarily is drafted in advance of, and therefore with imperfect
13. Id. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.
14. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 46, 622 A.2d 121, 125 (1993); see also McCready
Memorial Hosp. v. Hauser, 330 Md. 497, 504, 624 A.2d 1249, 1253 (1993); Williams v.
State, 329 Md. 1, 15, 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treas-
ury, Income Tax Div., 313 Md. 118, 124, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1988).
15. Taxiera v. Makus, 320 Md. 471, 480, 578 A.2d 761, 765 (1990); see also Tracey v.
Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324
Md. 454, 453, 597 A.2d 939, 943 (1991); Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597,
603, 573 A.2d 1346, 1348 (1990).
16. In re Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 393, 635 A.2d 427, 430 (1994) (quoting Kaczorowski,
309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632).
17. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Jameson, 332 Md. 723, 733, 633 A.2d 93, 98 (1993);
see also Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 585, 632 A.2d 797, 804 (1993); Government Employ-
ees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993); Fairbanks,
330 Md. at 46, 622 A.2d at 125.
18. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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appreciation for, the problems that will be encountered in its
application.' 9
However imperfectly, the General Assembly passes laws to achieve
some result in the world, and the court should look past the sins of
the text, whether ones of commission or omission, and help bring
about that intended result.
The legislative discussion . . . provides information that is
often useful in figuring out what the statute is all about, what
policies it purports to incorporate, and indeed what the
truth of the statute is. If legislative supremacy means any-
thing, it at least means a willingness, indeed an eagerness, of
the interpreter to listen to what our elected representatives
had to say about a text, even if the record is incomplete or
biased. °
The General Assembly knows that its enactments will not answer
all possible future questions, so the real issue is whether it manifested
a plan for how future interpreters shall resolve such questions. Did it
intend for the agency that administers a given statute to decide inter-
pretative questions through adjudication or rulemaking? Did it in-
tend for the courts to resolve such issues by applying common law
methodology to the statute's development?2 1 Or did it intend for the
eventual interpreters of the statute to resolve uncertainties by apply-
ing whatever law controlled before the statute's enactment?
19. POSNER, supra note 3, at 280.
20. William N. Eskridge,Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 665
(1990). Other commentators have made the same point. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 448 (1988) ("Ameri-
can public law has quite properly recognized that statutory meaning is necessarily greatly
influenced by statutory context. Legislative history is part of that context, and some as-
pects of it-such as committee reports-will frequently represent the most intelligent ex-
position available of what the statute is all about."). For an earlier formulation, see
FrederickJ. de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 527
(1940):
Legislative history should be searched only (1) to determine the broader contex-
tual meanings of the statutory language; (2) to clarify the purpose or objectives of
such legislation in view of the existent evils, the suggested remedies and the rele-
vant customs and usage both before and after its enactment; and (3) to use this
knowledge not only to choose the best meaning in view of these objectives, but
also to apply the statute so as to give them full effect.
Id. at 533. Professor de Sloovere also offered a cautionary note that will recur in this Arti-
cle: "In all three instances, extrinsic factual aids should be employed only from the most
clear and authoritative sources. . . ." I&
21. "Where... a statute is phrased in broad general terms, it suggests that the legisla-
ture intended the provision to be capable of encompassing circumstances and situations
which did not exist at the time of its enactment." Kindley v. Governor of Md., 289 Md. 620,
625, 426 A.2d 908, 911 (1981).
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Legislative history might suggest which course the Legislature in-
tended, but legislative history has value only to the extent that it helps
courts to choose accurately among competing interpretations. When
litigants present a court with a choice among interpretations, the
court must assign probabilities to the alternatives and ask how likely it
is that a particular interpretation accurately reflects what the Legisla-
ture intended to accomplish.22 If legislative history increases the
probability that the court's choice is correct, it is useful; if not, it is
worthless.
The Court of Appeals has gone awry by failing to make clear that
not all legislative history has equal value in the court's exercise of as-
signing probabilities to various statutory readings. Too often the
court has not differentiated the reliable from the unreliable, evidence
that genuinely might reflect the legislative purpose underlying the en-
acted bill from evidence that reflects little more than someone's effort
to gain leverage in the process. By indiscriminately assigning essen-
tially the same weight to each form of legislative history, the court
makes an error of the same type as affording legislative history too
much or too little weight altogether.23
This Article will review how the Court of Appeals currently ap-
proaches issues of statutory construction, how its use of legislative his-
tory potentially disserves the court's stated goal, and why a more
disciplined use of legislative history would better serve the quest for
"the truth of the statute."24
I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE REALITY OF MARYLAND'S
LEGISLATURE
In the seven years since Kaczorowski, the Court of Appeals has not
wavered from its commitment to the approach expounded in that
case. The court thus established for itself a task Professors Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks classically described as
[d]ecid[ing] what purposes ought to be attributed to the
statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be
involved; and then... [i]nterpret[ing] the words of the stat-
ute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose as
best [the court] can, making sure, however, that it does not
give the words either.., a meaning they will not bear, or...
22. Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 462-64.
23. Cf. Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and the
Courftroom, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 663, 685 (1987) ("According too much weight to legislative
history is as bad as according it too little.").
24. Eskridge, supra note 20, at 665.
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a meaning which would violate any established policy of clear
statement.
25
In many cases since Kaczorowski, the court has reiterated its commit-
ment to the pursuit of the legislative purpose or goal. In a recent
opinion the court wrote, "Every statute is enacted to further some un-
derlying goal or purpose-'to advance some interest, to attain some
end'-and must be construed in accordance with its general purposes
and policies. "26
Similar declarations about the goals of statutory construction in
opinions of the United States Supreme Court have inspired a strong
and sometimes successful counterattack from formalist critics, most
notably Justice Antonin Scalia.27 Justice Scalia has argued, with char-
25. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1411 (10th ed. 1958).
Some commentators view this "legal process" school of statutory construction as anti-
quated and insupportable in light of the insights of public choice theory, see, e.g., Frank
Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983) (arguing that a "meta-rule"
calling for judicial construction of statutes only when the statutes plainly address a problem
requires judges and administrators to supply their own solutions); William N. Eskridge,Jr.,
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA.
L. REv. 275, 275-76 (1988) (characterizing the traditional approach to statutory interpreta-
tion as based on the romanticized idea that "there is typically no tension between giving
effect to the expectations of Congress and accomplishing good policy"); and hermeneu-
tics, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv.
204, 221-22 (1980) (questioning the feasibility of achieving an accurate understanding of
legislators' intent). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REv. 761, 774, 777 (1987) (discussing factors that chal-
lenge the traditional view of statutory interpretation). A full assessment of these criticisms
is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that these skeptical criti-
ques of the "legal process" school, whatever their theoretical justification, do not seem to
fit the actual workings and product of the General Assembly. Furthermore, as Judge Pos-
ner observed, these critical attacks "have not succeeded either in creating widely accepted
alternative methods of interpretation or in persuading the profession that we should forget
about interpretation." Posner, supra, at 777. The Court of Appeals will continue to decide
cases of statutory interpretation, without being either paralyzed by the indeterminacy of
language or galvanized into constructing the law afresh in every case. This Article aspires
merely to analyze how the court actually goes about the work of statutory interpretation
and why it should change some of its methods.
26. Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 358-59, 643 A.2d 906, 909 (1994) (quoting
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632); see also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335
Md. 342, 346, 643 A.2d 442, 444 (1994); Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 171-72, 638 A.2d 93,
104 (1994); Allied Vending v. Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 306-07, 631 A.2d 77, 90 (1993); Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717
(1993); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seidel Chevrolet, Inc., 326 Md. 237, 248-49, 604 A.2d 473,
479 (1992); Ayres v. Townsend, 324 Md. 666, 672, 598 A.2d 470, 473 (1991):
27. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Frank Easterbrook, Legal Inter-
pretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL. 87, 89 (1984) (stating that
because words often lack fixed meanings, interpretive attempts by judges are closer to
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acteristic vigor, that the Supreme Court should abandon its traditional
reliance on legislative history and insist that Congress express itself
fully in the statutory text, for the text alone is the law.28
Whatever one may say of Congress's ability to respond to the aus-
tere regime Justice Scalia proposes, few would expect the Maryland
General Assembly to achieve the foresight and precision of expression
thatJustice Scalia's approach demands of Congress. One eminent ob-
server has wryly remarked, "[A ] s law is an instrument of governance
rather than a hymn to intellectual beauty, some consideration must be
given to practicalities."
29
The most important constitutional and practical fact about the
General Assembly is that, barring extraordinary circumstances, it
meets for only ninety days each year.30 Within those ninety days, the
General Assembly must pass a bill from introduction through hear-
ings, floor action, hearings in the other chamber and sometimes a
conference committee, a process that in Congress often takes a year
or two. The recent exponential growth in legislation that the General
Assembly produces has worsened the tyranny of the calendar. 1
Within this maelstrom, participants in the legislative process try
to achieve something. Sponsors have some purpose in mind when
they introduce legislation, and the bill drafters in the Department of
"literary interpretation" than legitimate legal interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1989) (presenting a sympathetic yet balanced assess-
ment ofJustice Scalia's approach to statutory construction); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations
About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371, 379 (arguing that "the benefits accru-
ing from the use of legislative history are marginal when weighed against the potential for
abuse and the enormous effort involved"). But see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative
History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 847 (1992) (defending the use of
legislative history on the basis that it "helps appellate courts reach interpretations that tend
to make the law itself more coherent, workable or fair").
28. See, e.g., Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99-100.
29. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain R., 854 F.2d 916, 925 (7th Cir. 1988) (Pos-
ner, J.).
30. MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 14 and 15(a).
31. During the term of Governor McKeldin from 1955 through 1958, the General As-
sembly passed 3623 pages of legislation. This amount was only slightly greater than the
General Assembly's output of 3405 pages during the term of Governor Goldsborough from
1912 through 1915, nearly a half-century earlier. From 1967 through 1970, the term Gov-
ernor Agnew began and Governor Mandel completed, the Assembly's output totaled 7103
pages. During the first term of Governor Hughes, from 1979 through 1982, the output was
13,619 pages. During the first term of Governor Schaefer, from 1987 through 1990, the
output was 16,002 pages. Although this method of measuring legislative output admittedly
is crude and tends to overstate activity when recodified articles of the Maryland Code are
presented, see infra note 37, it serves as a rough gauge. It also has an honorable antece-
dent in Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 527 (measuring increase in the volume of congres-
sional enactments by reference to page count).
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Legislative Reference12 try to find the right words to express that pur-
pose. Yet the politics of the process modify original purposes, and
drafting ambiguities and outright mistakes are not completely avoida-
ble. Therefore, when the purpose of a statute is no longer evident in
the text itself, a court trying to discern the statute's purpose naturally
will look to other potential sources.
A. Sources of Legislative History"
Because bills rarely appear out of thin air, many statutes have his-
tories that precede their introduction in bill form. Study groups
within the executive or legislative branch often issue reports that iden-
tify problems and propose solutions. For many years an entity called
the Legislative Council officially served that role. 4 The Court of Ap-
peals often has cited reports of the Legislative Council, which existed
from 1939 to 1976, in determining the purpose of legislation.3 ' The
Legislative Policy Committee,36 the standing committees, the Revisor
of Statutes, 7 and various ad hoc groups serve the same purpose now.
Similarly, agency and interest group requests for legislation might an-
32. The Departments of Legislative Reference and Fiscal Services are the support arms
of the General Assembly. Bill drafters, research analysts, and committee counsel for the
Senate Judicial Proceedings and Economic and Environmental Affairs Committees and for
the House Judiciary, Environmental Matters, Commerce and Government Affairs, and Eco-
nomic Matters Committees work for the Department of Legislative Reference. Committee
staff for the Senate Finance and Budget and Tax Committees and the House Ways and
Means and Appropriations Committees work for the Department of Fiscal Services.
33. As far as we are aware, the only existing account of legislative history in Maryland is
the aptly titled Ghost Hunting. See Michael S. Miller, Ghost Hunting: Finding Legislative
Intent in Maryland, a Checklist of Sources (1984) [hereinafter Ghost Hunting]
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors and available in the State Law Library). This
version of Ghost Hunting is the one the Court of Appeals most often cites. See, e.g.,
Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 619, 569 A.2d 693, 695 (1990); In re
Kemmo N., 315 Md. 193, 195, 553 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1989). A slightly revised version was
later published. Michael S. Miller & Judith Levinson, Ghost Hunting: Searching for Maryland
Legislative History, MD. B.J., July-August 1989, at 11.
34. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, § 28 (1957).
35. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131-
32, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993); Atlantic Sea-Con, Ltd. v. Dann, 321 Md. 275, 282, 582 A.2d
981, 984 (1990); Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 495, 554 A.2d 1238, 1249 (1989).
36. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 2-407(6), 2409(b) (1993).
37. The Revisor of Statutes is responsible for "code revision," the restatement of ex-
isting law into clearer form. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOVT § 2-1317 (1993). This process
results in recodified volumes of the Maryland Code. Within these recodifications are "Re-
visor's Notes," which explain the relationship between the source law and the recodifica-
tion. The Court of Appeals frequently refers to the Revisor's Notes when construing
recodified provisions. See, e.g., Belcher v. T. Rowe Price, 329 Md. 709, 745, 621 A.2d 872,
889-90 (1993); Abramson v. Montgomery County, 328 Md. 721, 736, 616 A.2d 894, 901
(1992); Comptroller of the Treasury, Retail Sales Tax Div. v. Digi-Data Corp., 317 Md. 212,
228, 562 A.2d 1259, 1267 (1989); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 265, 554
440 [VOL. 54:432
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swer the question of where a particular bill originated. As long as the
court takes care to identify the ways in which the Legislature departed
from the recommendations of such a source, these reports can pro-
vide valuable information regarding the statutory context.38
Documents reflecting the origins of a bill, the initial draft, and
any additional materials are consolidated in a file, maintained first by
the committee to which the bill is assigned and later by the Depart-
ment of Legislative Reference Library.39 Although the volume of ma-
terial varies markedly from one bill to another, some elements of
legislative history are universal to all bill files, or at least typical to most
of them.
A fiscal note, prepared by the Department of Fiscal Services, sum-
marizes every bill and estimates its fiscal impact.40 Because the Mary-
land Constitution imposes a balanced budget requirement,41 and
therefore any outlay of State funds imposes opportunity costs, partici-
pants in the process pay particular attention to fiscal notes.42 Because
it assesses a bill's projected fiscal impact, a fiscal note often can be
important evidence of a bill's scope or intended effect.4"
In addition, the staffs of all committees of the State Senate and
most committees of the House of Delegates prepare official commit-
tee documents concerning bills. These documents typically are a "bill
A.2d 366, 372 (1989); Dean v. Pinder, 312 Md. 154, 163, 538 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1988); In re
Taylor, 312 Md. 58, 67-68, 537 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1988).
38. See Reed Dickerson, Statuto" Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOF-
sTRA L. REv. 1125, 1130-31 (1983) (arguing that study group reports prepared by official
bodies researching legislative solutions to social problems are reliable because the result-
ing legislation likely embodies the same purposes as those in the report, but cautioning
that other indications in the legislative history should confirm this probability).
39. Before the early 1970s, legislative committees created but then discarded bill files
by the end of each session. The bill files of certain committees for the years 1973 to 1976
still exist. Files exist for all bills from 1977 to the present. Bill files remain in their respec-
tive committees for one or two years before being sent to the Department of Legislative
Reference Library. The library maintains these files in hard copy for two to three years
before converting them to microfilm. Files for the years 1977 to 1990 are now available on
microfilm in various libraries; original files are in the State Archives.
40. The practice of creating fiscal notes for all bills and resolutions began in 1968. The
Department of Fiscal Services now must, by law, prepare a fiscal note for each bill; a com-
mittee may refuse to vote on a bill unless a fiscal note accompanies it MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE Gov'T § 2-1505 (1993).
41. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(5a).
42. Estimates of fiscal impact often originate with executive branch agencies, which
sometimes have an incentive to manipulate the projections, inflating the cost estimates for
bills that the agency opposes and deflating them for bills that it supports. Legislators are
familiar with this phenomenon and presumably apply appropriate discounts.
43. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seidel Chevrolet, Inc., 326 Md. 237, 252, 604 A.2d
473, 480-81 (1992) (rejecting a construction that would have resulted in significant fiscal
impact not mentioned in fiscal note).
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analysis" of legislation pending before the committee and a "floor re-
port" of legislation that is favorably reported. 4 These two documents
embody the present committee reporting system in Maryland.45
Bill analyses often simply paraphrase the main provisions of bills,
without elaborating upon underlying objectives. For this reason, bill
analyses generally are not as rich a source of information as congres-
sional committee reports.46
The purpose of floor reports is to help the committee chairman
describe a bill when it comes up for a floor vote. Floor reports gener-
ally provide more valuable clues than bill analyses to the purpose un-
derlying the bill, because floor reports often summarize the key
testimony at hearings and the import of any significant amendments
made in committee. Ordinarily, a committee does not explain why it
rejects proposed amendments; the Court of Appeals, however, some-
times infers that a committee rejected an amendment because the
committee disagreed with the amendment's substance.47
Apart from formal journal entries that simply record actions
taken,48 floor debate yields no legislative history. Whatever insights
44. Bills that are defeated in committee receive an "unfavorable report," but there is
no document articulating the reason for the committee's decision.
45. The present committee reporting system began as a pilot project by the Depart-
ment of Legislative Reference in 1982 for the purpose of creating an official legislative
history of a bill. The pilot project started in the Senate Judicial Proceedings, Economic
Affairs, and former Constitutional and Public Law Committees. The House of Delegates
did not participate in the project after some committee chairmen voiced concerns that the
bill reports would better reflect the bias of the staff member drafting the report than the
objective that the Legislature was trying to achieve. Also, the House did not want to create
a system similar to the congressional committee system. Since then, however, the House
Economic Matters and Environmental Matters Committees have instituted the committee
reporting system. While its original purpose was to create official legislative history, it has
evolved into a less formal process geared to meet the individual needs of each committee
chairman. Thus, the reports differ in form and content depending on the committee that
drafted them. Indeed, committee counsel often view the reports as tools to assist the chair-
man and the members of the committee in understanding and explaining the bill in com-
mittee and on the floor rather than as documents that courts subsequently will use to infer
legislative purpose.
46. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 449-50 (arguing that a thorough analysis of
legislative intent must include an examination of committee reports-documents legisla-
tors and staff probably will read more carefully than the resulting bills); see also Abner J.
Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 385 (stating that the commit-
tee report, which "represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and debate on
the issue," is the most useful device in determining legislative intent).
47. See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 313 Md. 118,
125, 544 A.2d 764, 767-68 (1988); see also infra notes 136, 155 and accompanying text.
48. MD. CONST. art. III, § 22 ("Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and
cause the same to be published."). Thesejournals record the introduction of bills, amend-
ments proposed by committees and adopted on the floor, and voting results.
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into legislative purpose that floor colloquies can reveal are lost, for
there is no Maryland equivalent of the Congressional Record.49
A last source of explanatory material that legislative decision-mak-
ers consider is advice from the Counsel to the General Assembly, a
division of the Attorney General's office. Frequently during a session,
someone will ask for an explanation of a bill's relation to other law or
of its legal effect. One usually can infer that the General Assembly
accepts such requested advice as a premise for further legislative ac-
tion.50 The Court of Appeals has recognized this reliance factor and
therefore the significance of such advice in revealing the purpose un-
derlying a statute. 1
A statute also has a limited post-passage, but pre-enactment, legis-
lative history. The Attorney General reviews every passed bill for con-
stitutionality and legal sufficiency, and a "bill review" letter to the
Governor embodies the results of that review.2 The Governor then
takes account of the Attorney General's legal assessment, along with
any policy considerations, in deciding whether to veto a bill. If the
Governor does veto a bill, a veto message may be part of the context
for revised legislation in the future.
B. The Authoritative Voices of the Key Players
The role of committee chairmen as floor managers is but one
aspect of their larger task: to maintain control of, and establish policy
priorities within, a process that often threatens to careen toward the
edge of chaos. Committee chairmen exercise significant influence by
49. Since 1991, floor debate in the Senate has been recorded but not transcribed. The
tapes are available to the public for a small fee. Memorandum from Library and Informa-
tion Services Division, Department of Legislative Reference (July 1994) (on file with au-
thors). As far as the authors are aware, no litigant has yet proffered a privately transcribed
version of floor debate as part of a bill's legislative history.
50. The General Assembly similarly relies on the much less frequent formal opinions of
the Attorney General regarding the legal landscape within which the new statute will fit.
By contrast, the Legislature may view as mere advocacy pieces the legal analyses written by
those sections of the Attorney General's office that counsel the various executive branch
agencies, each of which seeks to promote its own legislative agenda. Also, on occasion the
Attorney General avowedly advocates for or against legislation.
51. See State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 297-99, 554 A.2d 366, 388-89, cert.
denied 493 U.S. 816 (1989). In Burning Tree Club, the court held that the Legislature in-
tended one portion of a statute to be severable because the Attorney General's office had
so advised the Legislature, despite the court's opinion that the advice had been incorrect!
Id.
52. Bills that raise no issues worth discussing receive the Attorney General's approval in
a form letter.
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trying to ensure passage of those bills identified with the legislative
leadership"3 and to kill those bills the leadership actively opposes.
As in Congress, committees "serve as devices to screen out the
vast majority of policy proposals."14 Committees also save time on the
floor by resolving identifiable problems with the bills that have
enough political support to pass. While this process results in widely
varying degrees of understanding of the bills by committee members,
the chairman of the jurisdictional committee understands the basic
purpose of most bills and is responsible for the explanation of bills in
committee documents. 55
Another consequence of the time pressure and the sheer volume
of legislation is specialization among legislators. Sometimes the spe-
cialization is recognized formally. This occurs, for example, when a
handful of committee members with a particular interest in an issue is
designated as a subcommittee or work group to hammer out legisla-
tion on the issue. Often, specialization is simply a matter of self-selec-
tion; a legislator who is interested in a topic develops a reputation for
expertise on that topic. For example, a few members of the House
and the Senate receive wide recognition from their colleagues and
outside observers as articulate and knowledgeable proponents of envi-
ronmental protection.
One consequence of this specialization is collegial deference, es-
pecially in the House of Delegates. If a legislator generally favors envi-
ronmental protection measures, for example, but has not taken the
time to assess the merits of some particular environmental bill, seeing
whether a recognized environmental leader in the chamber is a spon-
sor or cosponsor is an easy and reliable guide to voting on the bill.
53. Many bills that the Senate President, Speaker of the House, and committee chair-
men introduce do not reflect their personal policy views. By custom, the President and the
Speaker introduce "administration" bills that the Governor has proposed, while committee
chairmen introduce "departmental" bills that executive branch agencies have proposed.
DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATOR'S HAND-
BOOK 13, 49 (1990).
54. William N. Eskridge,Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE LJ. 331, 370 (1991). More than half of all bills die in the committee to which they are
referred after introduction. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATrE REFERENCE, supra note 53, at 57.
The Maryland General Assembly has only ten principal standing committees-four in the
Senate, and six in the House. Thus, these committees have broadjurisdiction. The House
Environmental Matters Committee, for example, has jurisdiction not only over environ-
mental legislation but also over "general health policy, mental health and the developmen-
tally disabled, the elderly, health occupations regulation, and agriculture." Id at 17.
55. That staff members actually draft these documents is of little consequence. Com-
mittee chairmen would have a strong incentive to pay attention to what is written there,
especially if the Court of Appeals were to give greater weight to these documents than to
other parts of the legislative history. See infra text accompanying notes 163-164.
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The views of a sponsor, then, speak for many legislators through a
kind of ideological delegation. "[Ilt is not necessarily true that each
member of a legislative majority behind a particular bill will have
bothered to study the details of the bill he voted for; he may simply
have assented to the deal struck by the sponsors of the bill."56
In addition, legislators sometimes vote on a bill for reasons en-
tirely unrelated to its merits. Simple vote-trading is hardly unknown:
If you vote for my bill X, I'll vote for your bill Y. A variant is voting to
avoid the committee chairman's displeasure; in a system that invests
enormous power in committee chairmen, including control of the
committee's agenda,57 a legislator may assent to the chairman's wishes
on many bills of little interest simply to improve the prospects in com-
mittee of the bills about which the legislator really does care. Institu-
tional tradition also guides some votes: when a bill is reported out of
committee to the floor, a committee member usually does not vote
against the committee's favorable report, even if the member voted
against the bill in committee and might vote against the bill again
when it is up for final passage. In addition, under a practice known as
"local courtesy," everyone votes for another delegation's local bills so
that the favor will be returned.5"
These realities of the legislative process in Maryland suggest that
some parts of the legislative history-sponsor testimony, committee
56. POSNER, supra note 3, at 269 (pointing out also that those to whom other legislators
defer have an incentive to represent the purpose of their bills fairly, for "unless the terms
of the deal are stated accurately in the committee reports and in the floor comments of the
sponsors, the sponsors will have difficulty striking deals in the future"); see also Hetzel, supra
note 23, at 685 (noting that while the remarks of sponsors, party leaders, and the commit-
tee chair can be instructive as to legislative intent, the comments of those opposing the
bills are not); James Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation, "43 HARv. L. REv. 886, 888-89
(1930) (observing that "[t]hrough the committee report, the explanation of the commit-
tee chairman and otherwise, a mere expression of assent becomes in reality a concurrence
in the expressed views of another"). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Val-
ues, 66 CHi.-KENT L. Rav. 365, 402 (1990) (arguing that some statements in committee
reports merely are "'sales talk' put in the legislative history as a respectable explanation for
the deals that actually were made.").
57. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 431 ("[A]genda rules increase the power of
the legislative leadership to control outcomes, at least in the short run. Having powerful
leadership should increase the predictability and intelligibility of results."). Committee
chairmen in Maryland have augmented power because the jurisdiction of each committee
is so broad. See supra note 54.
58. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 408 n.6, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 n.6
(1990) ("Under the tradition of local courtesy, [local bills] would ordinarily pass ... if
supported by legislators from that County.") (citation omitted); M. Peter Moser, County
Home Rule-Sharing the State's Legislative Power with Maryland Counties, 28 MD. L. REv 327,
343 (1968) ("Local laws are nearly always passed if recommended favorably by a select
committee dominated by the local delegation from the area to which the law would
apply.").
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bill analyses, and committee floor reports-are likely to be especially
reliable evidence of the purpose or goal underlying a statute. These
materials reflect the views of those most likely to know something
about the legislation and to whom other members, for a variety of
reasons, tend to defer.
C. Voices from the Outside
The bulk of a typical bill's in-session legislative history has no leg-
islative branch provenance. A bill file generally contains a copy of
letters written about a bill and any written testimony of witnesses at a
hearing.59 Unlike congressional hearings, initial hearings on bills in
the General Assembly are open to the public.'
These parts of the legislative history are not necessarily a reliable
guide to the General Assembly's purposes. Indeed, they might be al-
together misleading. "[I] t is one thing to assume that legislators who
vote for a bill defer to the understanding of the bill expressed by its
sponsors and another to assume that they adopt the statements of wit-
nesses, or nonsponsoring legislators (perhaps opponents of the legis-
lation), who want to impart some twist to the statute when it is applied
by the courts."61 As we shall explain,6 2 the failure of the Court of Ap-
peals to make important distinctions among the various types of legis-
lative history is an invitation to mischief.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE PROCESS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This portion of the Article will explore the methods by which the
Court of Appeals discerns the legislative purpose underlying the statu-
tory text at issue in a case. In particular, this section will summarize
the ways in which the court uses legislative history in that pursuit. The
Appendix to this Article provides an overview of the court's recourse
to legislative history by identifying the types of legislative history the
59. Since 1992, Senate standing committees have recorded each bill hearing.
Although the tapes are available on request, they are not transcribed. See Memorandum,
supra note 49, at 1. Some files contain synopses of hearings, presumably prepared by a
committee staff member. See, e.g., file on S.B. 717, 1981 Session. One may find the ulti-
mate in cryptic legislative history in the files of some bills heard by the Senate Economic
Matters Committee when the late Harry McGuirk was chairman: McGuirk had an aide take
shorthand notes of testimony. These untranscribed notes remain preserved in the files.
See, e.g., file on S.B. 538, 1978 Session.
60. When a bill passes out of the chamber of origin and is heard in the other chamber,
often only the bill's sponsor testifies.
61. POSNER, supra note 3, at 270; see also Dickerson, supra note 38, at 1131 (testimony at
hearings is "so unreliable, even when it appears to make good sense, that courts should pay
little heed to it, except possibly for confirmatory purposes").
62. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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Court of Appeals has used in statutory construction cases from Kaczor-
owski, decided in May 1987, through mid-1994.63
As the court made clear in Kaczorowski, and has confirmed in
many later cases, the text of the statute is the starting point of analy-
sis. 64 Judge Posner terms this approach "[a] milder version"65 of the
traditional "'plain meaning' rule, [which] holds that in interpreting a
statute courts should begin, though perhaps not end, with the words
of the statute."66 The Court of Appeals used this approach in the
manner Judge Posner details: the "start with the words" canon has
both temporal and logical priority.67 That is, the court does more
than recite the text in question first; it also treats the text as "the most
important evidence of [the statute's] meaning-which it normally
is-or at least indispensable evidence-which it always is." s6 Some-
times the court stops there, finding it unnecessary "to go further than
the scrutiny of statutory language, for the language itself may be suffi-
ciently expressive of the legislative purpose."69
Sometimes, although the meaning of the text seems clear, the
court nevertheless dips into the legislative history. For example, in In
re Demitriusj.,70 the issue was whether a juvenile court had the author-
ity to order the Department of Juvenile Services both to place a delin-
63. The Appendix omits statutory construction cases in which the court did not refer
to legislative history. It also omits cases that refer to legislative history for purposes unre-
lated to statutory construction. See, e.g., Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368-70, 601
A.2d 102, 115-16 (1992) (citing legislative history to establish legislative objective for pur-
poses of constitutional review).
64. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 452
(1994); In re Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 392-93, 635 A.2d 427, 429-30 (1994); Popham v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 333 Md. 136, 148, 634 A.2d 28, 34 (1993); In re Keith G., 325 Md.
538, 542, 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992).
65. Richard A. Posner, Statutoy Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 807 (1983).
66. Id. Judge Posner posits that "as a description of what judges do, the proposition is
false. The judge rarely starts his inquiry with the words of the statute, and often, if the
truth be told, he does not look at the words at all." Id at 807-08.
67. Id. at 808.
68. Id.
69. Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 603, 573 A.2d 1346, 1348 (1990);
see also Bacon v. State, 322 Md. 140, 147, 586 A.2d 18, 22 (1991); Davis v. State, 319 Md. 56,
61-62, 570 A.2d 855, 858 (1990). A few bills contain a statement of legislative purpose in
the form of a preamble. See, e.g., Health Care Decisions Act of 1993, ch. 372, 1993 Md.
Laws 2007, 2039; Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 346, 1993 Md. Laws 1916 (homelessness preven-
tion program). Although a preamble is not a part of the statute itself, it is voted on as part
of the bill and can be amended, and the Court of Appeals properly gives it considerable
weight. See, e.g, Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537, 539-40 (1994); McAlear
v. McAlear, 298 Md, 320, 344 & n.26, 469 A.2d 1256, 1268 & n.26 (1984); Dillon v. State,
277 Md. 571,583, 357 A.2d 360, 367-68 (1976).
70. 321 Md. 468, 583 A.2d 258 (1991).
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quent child in a specific private facility and to pay the cost of that
placement." After reviewing the language in the pertinent statute,
and its relationship to other statutes bearing on the authority of the
juvenile court and the Department, the court concluded that "the leg-
islative scheme shines bright and clear."7 According to the court,
"the plain language of the statute places these matters within the
sound discretion of [the Department].""' Nevertheless, the court
went on to recite the history of the provision, citing fiscal notes, state
and local government agency position papers, and two letters from
the Attorney General.
74
While the court commonly uses legislative history to confirm its
interpretation of the statute's plain language, Kaczorowshi itself is the
rare case in which the court used legislative history to negate the re-
sult that the text otherwise would compel.75 As the plaintiff in Kaczor-
owski pointed out, the General Assembly unquestionably had repealed
the law authorizing the Industrial Development Authority of Balti-
more City.76 The court recited the sequence of enactments concern-
ing industrial development financing to demonstrate that the
Legislature intended to promote economic development through
these means, but that the drafting process had gotten muddled.77
Against this background, it was most improbable that the General As-
sembly actually sought to repeal the basis on which industrial develop-
ment activity took place in Baltimore City. The court then verified
this assessment by reviewing the stated purposes of a relevant legisla-
tive study and legislative committee notes. 7' Discerning from these
materials that "the legislative goal [was] improvement of the [indus-
trial development financing] mechanism,"79 the court declared that it
71. Id. at 470, 583 A.2d at 259.
72. Id. at 474, 583 A.2d at 261.
73. Id. at 475, 583 A.2d at 262.
74. Id. at 476-77, 583 A.2d at 262; see also In re Kemmo N., 315 Md. 193, 200, 553 A.2d
1273, 1276 (1989) (reciting legislative history to confirm statutory meaning although text
"could not be more clear").
75. In a few cases, the court simply defies unambiguous text by declaring the result
unreasonable, without adducing any basis in the legislative history for doing so. See, e.g.,
Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 648 (1991). However courts might dress up
decisions like this as explications of legislative intent, see, e.g., id. at 173, 596 A.2d at 653,
these cases actually reflect a straightforward substitution of the court's policy views for
those of the General Assembly. See id. at 176, 596 A.2d at 654 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
76. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 507, 525 A.2d 628, 629 (1987).
77. Id. at 509, 525 A.2d at 630.
78. Id. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632.
79. Id. at 520, 525 A.2d at 635.
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would not "permit a patent drafting error to frustrate this goal by
bringing about the demise of the Baltimore Authority.""0
The most interesting cases are those in which the court uses legis-
lative history to choose between competing interpretations of ambigu-
ous text."' In Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shrader,"2 for example, the
pertinent statute stated that the Motor Vehicle Administration "shall
set a hearing for a date within 30 days of the receipt of [a] request" for
a hearing after a driver's license had been suspended on the basis of a
driver's refusal to take a blood alcohol test.13 The Administration had
missed this deadline when scheduling the appellee's hearing.8 4 The
question was whether the proper sanction for noncompliance was dis-
missal of the Administration's action.8 5
The court focused on the statute's omission of any specified sanc-
tion for the Administration's failure to meet the deadline:
While a statute or rule may dictate a mandatory duty on the
part of any agency or party, non-compliance with that statute
or rule does not necessarily require a dismissal of the case.
Thus, we must examine the provisions of § 16-205.1, which
are silent as to any sanctions to be imposed for non-compli-
80. Id. Even "new textualists" accept the need to "look at legislative history when there
is a strong possibility that the text reflects a scrivener's error," or "when the apparent tex-
tual meaning of a statute is unreasonable." Eskridge, supra note 27, at 697. Kaczorowski
involved an error of commission: the General Assembly accidentally repealed provisions
that it undoubtedly meant to retain. An example of the converse-using Kaczorowski to
correct an inadvertent error of omission-appears in 75 Op. Att'y Gen. - (No. 90-060),
18:2 Md. Reg. 104 (Dec. 12, 1990) (concerning omission of "grandfather" provision from
statute tightening licensing requirements for nursing home administrators).
81. This article does not address the interpretive role of the court if an administrative
agency has construed an ambiguous statute in a regulation. In the federal system, such a
regulation, if reasonable, would preclude a contraryjudicial construction. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As one commentator
put it, Chevron is
a frank recognition that sometimes interpretation is not simply a matter of uncov-
ering legislative will, but also involves extratextual considerations of various kinds,
including judgments about how a statute is best or most sensibly implemented.
Chevron reflects a salutary understanding that these judgments of policy and prin-
ciple should be made by administrators rather than judges.
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 2071, 2088
(1990). The Court of Appeals never has cited Chevron, though the court sometimes gives a
weaker form of deference to agency interpretations. See, e.g., Christ v. Department of Natu-
ral Resources, 335 Md. 427, 445, 644 A.2d 34, 42 (1994) (stating that the authority dele-
gated to executive branch agencies may include a broad power to promulgate rules to
implement the statute).
82. 324 Md. 454, 597 A.2d 939 (1991).
83. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i) (1992).
84. Shrader, 324 Md. at 458, 597 A.2d at 940.
85. Id. at 459, 597 A.2d at 941.
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ance with the 30 day scheduling requirement, to determine
whether dismissal of the order of suspension is a proper
sanction . *86
The Court of Appeals concluded that dismissal was not mandatory.87
The court sought to relate the hearing deadline provisions to the pur-
pose of the law as a whole, and in turn sought evidence of that pur-
pose in the legislative history: an advice letter from the Counsel to the
General Assembly, a letter from an official of the Baltimore City Police
Department, and a Senate committee floor report.88 The court con-
cluded that "the General Assembly's desire for swift and certain action
against drunk drivers""9 would not be served by mandatory dismissal:
"[D] ismissing a suspension under these circumstances would be inimi-
cal to the interests of the public and would enhance the interests of
the presumptively drunken driver, an outcome that is contrary to our
holdings and to the General Assembly's expressed sentiments. "9°
When the court uses legislative history, it does so avidly. Some of
the court's opinions read as if a law clerk copied everything in the bill
file and then arrayed this material in a draft opinion like laundry on a
clothesline.9' In State v. Runkles,9" the court announced that it had
"perused all of the items in the legislative file"9" in order to "tree [ ]
the ghost of legislative intent."94 The court, however, does not always
pay sufficient attention to a document's relationship to the enacted
statute. In Runkles, the court reviewed a floor report prepared by the
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on Senate Bill 58 of the 1989
86. Id. at 462, 597 A.2d at 943.
87. Id. at 463, 597 A.2d at 943.
88. Id. at 464, 597 A.2d at 944.
89. Id. at 467, 597 A.2d at 945.
90. Id.
91. When a law clerk drafts an opinion, the draft might reflect the failure of law
schools to prepare students sufficiently to work with statutory materials. See POSNER, supra
note 3, at 336-37; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 691, 691-93 (1987); Farber &
Frickey, supra note 20, at 451 n.101; ("In this light, it is understandable, although lamenta-
ble, that law clerks less skilled in statutory areas than other matters end up drafting opin-
ions that mechanically treat every conceivable source of statutory interpretation at length
and find all of them supportive of the ultimate result.").
92. 326 Md. 384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992). The case is discussed in Samantha Rosenberg,
Expanding the Scope of the Prohibition Against "Child Selling," Developments in Maryland Law,
1991-92, 52 MD. L. REv. 739 (1993).
93. Id. at 393, 605 A.2d at 115.
94. Runkles, 326 Md. at 398, 605 A.2d at 118. The legislative file contained everything
from committee reports to newspaper clippings to an unsigned document that the court,
without any basis, attributed to a committee chairman. Id. at 393-98, 605 A.2d at 115-18.
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Session, which eventually became Maryland's "baby selling" statute. 95
The court, calling the floor report "inaccurate in several respects,"9 6
described alleged discrepancies between the report and the enacted
bill.97 In fact, it was the court's own characterization that was inaccu-
rate, not the report. The floor report described Senate Bill 58 in the
form in which the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee had passed
it. The House Judiciary Committee then significantly amended the
bill, and that amended version ultimately was signed into law. Thus,
the floor report's authors never had intended it to describe the final
version of the bill. Indeed, the only document the court even men-
tioned that contained an accurate description of the enacted bill was
entitled "Explanation of Concurrence."98
Frequently, and properly, the court relies on a bill sponsor's testi-
mony in ascribing purpose to a statute.99 Yet the court also is willing
to assign to the General Assembly purposes that only advocates iden-
tify, with no explicit evidence that any key participant in the enact-
ment process had adopted the piece of advocacy.100 In Eagan v.
Ayd, 1°1 for example, the issue was whether the statute imposing spe-
cific sanctions on a putative father who fails to take a court-ordered
blood test should be read to limit the court's power to hold the recal-
95. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35E (1992) (stating that a person may not sell, barter,
or trade a child for anything of value).
96. Runkles, 326 Md. at 397 n.6, 605 A.2d at 117 n.6.
97. Id. at 397, 605 A.2d at 117-18.
98. Id. at 395-96, 605 A.2d at 117. The Court of Special Appeals also made a similar
error in the same case. Runkles v. State, 87 Md. App. 492, 590 A.2d 552 (1991), rev'd, 326
Md. 384, 605 A.2d 111 (1992). The court used the Senate floor report to support its inter-
pretation of the baby-selling statute without recognizing that the floor report did not actu-
ally describe the bill that ultimately passed.
99. SeeAllied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 327, 631 A.2d 77, 101 (1993);
State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 57, 629 A.2d 753, 760 (1993); Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md.
39, 47, 622 A.2d 121, 125 (1993); Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 285, 619 A.2d 111, 116
(1993); Runkles, 326 Md. at 394, 605 A.2d at 116; In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 62,
591 A.2d 468, 479 (1991); Webber v. State, 320 Md. 238, 245-46, 577 A.2d 58, 61-62 (1990);
State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 622, 566 A.2d 88, 92 (1989); State v. Toney, 315 Md. 122, 134,
553 A.2d 696, 702 (1989); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Keane, 311 Md. 336, 341, 534
A.2d 1337, 1340 (1988).
100. See Sheldon, 332 Md. at 57, 629 A.2d at 760; Leppo v. State Highway Admin., 330
Md. 416, 424-25, 624 A.2d 539, 543-44 (1993); Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519,
528-29, 597 A.2d 972, 976-77 (1991); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 465,
597 A.2d 939, 944 (1991); Webber, 320 Md. at 246, 577 A.2d at 62; Rucker v. Harford
County, 316 Md. 275, 301, 558 A.2d 399, 411 (1989); Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 68-69,
553 A.2d 667, 670 (1988); State v. Crampton, 314 Md. 265, 269-70, 550 A.2d 693, 695
(1988); Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 276, 545 A.2d 55, 60 (1988).
101. 313 Md. 265, 545 A.2d 55 (1988). The case is discussed in Samantha H. Forman,
Use of Contempt Power in Paternity Proceedings, Developments in Maryland Law, 1988-89, 49 MD.
L. REv. 681 (1990).
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citrant father in contempt.10 2 As part of the analysis leading to its
holding that the statute did not have this effect, the court stated that
one "goal of this legislation was to 'assist [the State] in arriving at
more pre-trial settlements' in paternity cases and thus curtailing the
expenditure of 'court time, prosecutor time and staff time.'"'1 3 The
court did not draw its articulation of the supposed legislative goal
from a committee report or a sponsor's testimony. Rather, the quota-
tion was from the "testimony of George Sinclair."114 Who George Sin-
clair was, and why the court believed it properly could ascribe his
views to the General Assembly, the court did not explain.
In State v. Sheldon,'0 5 a case involving the constitutionality of Mary-
land's cross-burning statute, one of the points in dispute was whether
the statute was a content-based speech regulation and therefore sub-
ject to the most exacting level of review under the First Amendment,
or whether it was a content-neutral fire safety regulation.'0 6 The court
concluded that "the legislative history of the cross burning statute
reveals that the State's true purpose in enacting the statute was to ex-
press disagreement with the act of burning religious symbols." 0 7 The
court determined this "true purpose" in part through the testimony of
one of the bill's sponsors, which is a reliable indicator.' The court,
however, went on to cite testimony and letters from supporters of the
legislation outside the General Assembly, none of whom, the court
pointed out, described the legislation as intended to prevent fires. 109
"These comments," wrote the court, "all indicate that the General As-
sembly regarded the cross burning statute not as a fire prevention
measure but as a means of obstructing the message inherent in cross
burning."'1 0 The court's guess about the General Assembly's purpose
might have been correct, but the testimony of advocates by itself proves
102. Eagan, 313 Md. at 268, 545 A.2d at 56.
103. Id. at 275, 545 A.2d at 59 (quoting testimony in committee file).
104. Id.
105. 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753 (1993). The case is discussed in ChaseJ. Sanders, Bearing
the First Amendment's Crosses: An Analysis of State v. Sheldon, 53 MD. L. REv. 494 (1994); see
also Fernando I. Ruiz, Striking Down Maryland's Cross Burning Statute, Developments in Mary-
land Law, 1992-93, 53 MD. L. REv. 718 (1994).
106. The statute prohibited the burning of "any cross or other religious symbol upon
any private or public property... without the express consent of the owner of such prop-
erty and without first giving notice to the fire department." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10A
(1992).
107. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 56, 629 A-2d at 759.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 57, 629 A.2d at 760.
110. Id.
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nothing about what the General Assembly regarded as the objective of
the legislation."'
Sometimes the court's taste for legislative history has caused it to
rely on materials that it ought to ignore as inherently dubious-
namely, unidentified notes that happen to be in the bill file." t 2 In
Warfield v. State,"13 one issue involved the mens rea requirement for
the crime of breaking and entering a storehouse.' 14 In concluding
that the statute required proof of a general intent to break and enter,
the court bolstered its understanding of legislative purpose by quoting
"[a] handwritten note undated and unidentified.""'
Perhaps most oddly, the court has treated documents prepared
outside the Legislature long after the enactment of the provision in
question as if they were legislative history. In In re Adoption No.
9979,116 the issue was whether a statute that generally prohibited pay-
ments in connection with adoption placement barred the adopting
parents from paying for the birth mother's maternity clothes." 7 In
ruling that the prohibition did extend to this payment, the court
quoted from a 1988 report by a subcommittee of Maryland judges.' 8
How this report could be relevant legislative history about a statute
that was enacted in 1947 is puzzling indeed."'
111. Testimony that one can link to a specific legislative response is probative evidence
of the legislative objective. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Webber v. State, 320 Md. 238, 247, 577 A.2d 58, 62 (1990) (relying on a
handwritten note explaining legislative purpose); Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318
Md. 615, 621-22, 569 A-2d 693, 696 (1990) (relying on an unsigned, undated, handwritten
note).
113. 315 Md. 474, 554 A.2d 1238 (1989). The case is discussed in Debra T. Lubman,
Presering Sufficiency of the Evidence Review, Developments in Maryland Law, 1988-89, 49 MD. L.
Rxv. 637 (1990).
114. Warfield, 315 Md. at 495, 554 A.2d at 1249.
115. Id. at 497, 554 A.2d at 1250.
116. 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991). The case is discussed in Jennifer S. Ieete, Permis-
sible Reimbursement of Birth Mothers'Expenses in Direct Adaptions, Developments in Maryland Law,
1990-91, 51 MD. L. REv. 716 (1992).
117. In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. at 41, 591 A.2d at 475.
118. Id. at 45, 591 A.2d at 471.
119. The concurrence hammered the point home:
The subcommittee report is nothing more than the particular view of the four
trial judges making up the subcommittee as to how [the statute] should be ap-
plied. It is not "legislative history" with regard to [the statute], as it in no way
reflects the views of members of the General Assembly. Moreover... [u] nder no
circumstance can the report be said to be contemporaneous with the enactment
of the statute.
Id. at 63 n.6, 591 A.2d at 480 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S APPROACH
A. Lobbying the Court
The evidence of the post-Kaczorowski era shows a Court of Appeals
that loves legislative history not wisely but too well. 121 In over one-
third of the cases listed in the appendix, the court cited materials
originating with advocates outside the General Assembly. The court's
seine net approach to legislative history increases the risk that the
court will attribute a purpose to the General Assembly that it never
really legislated.
Some legislation ultimately passes only because the enacting legis-
lators compromise or paper over controversial points. For this reason,
a court must be careful not to confuse what the interest group or
agency that promoted the legislation wanted and what the Legislature
ultimately gave it:
[E]ven when it is obvious that a particular statute was pro-
cured by an interest group. . . it will often be unclear, with-
out an inquiry that is beyond judicial capacity to undertake,
how completely the group prevailed upon [the Legislature]
to do its will; the statute as ultimately enacted may well repre-
sent, to some unknown degree, a compromise with compet-
ing interest groups.1"1
Overreliance on selected testimony might cause a court to "miss the
intended compromise and, by interpreting the statute broadly, give
the interest group behind it more than it actually gained in the legisla-
tive bargaining process. "122
When the Court of Appeals uncritically latches on to anything in
the file as a basis for its judgment about legislative purpose, it aug-
ments its discretion to apply its own policy preferences-to pick out a
friend in the crowd of legislative history, to use the metaphor in the
epigraph to this Article.1 21 Yet to give weight to advocacy pieces in the
bill file may be inconsistent with the Legislature's objective of going
no further than the compromise of which the statute is the product:
120. Following the lead of the Court of Appeals, statutory construction opinions of the
Maryland Attorney General typically make generous use of available legislative history.
Some of these opinions are open to the same criticism that we apply to the court. See, e.g.,
78 Op. Att'y Gen. __ (No. 93-049), 21:8 Md. Reg. 605, 608 (Dec. 3, 1993) (employing
testimony of advocates); 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 317, 322 (1988) (employing unexplained nota-
tions in committee file).
121. POSNER, supra note 3, at 268.
122. Id.
123. See supra note I and accompanying text.
[VOL. 54:432
USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN MARYLAND
In the case of interest group legislation it is most likely that
the extent of the bargain.., is exhausted by the subjects of
the express compromises reflected in the statute. The legis-
lature ordinarily would rebuff any suggestions that judges be
authorized to fill in blanks in the "spirit" of the compromise.
Most compromises lack "spirit," and in any event one part of
the deal is to limit the number of blanks to be filled in
later.1
24
Excessive reliance on legislative history invites lobbyists to try to
win indirectly, through the legislative history, what they lack the votes
to win directly. Efforts to create, forestall, or negotiate legislative his-
tory are the stock in trade of congressional lobbyists, what Judge Starr
calls "a virtual cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so that
the Congress will appear to embrace their particular view in a given
statute."
125
Such efforts by lobbyists to exert influence over legislative history
are not particularly objectionable, any more than are their attempts to
shape the wording of the statute itself. Justice Breyer has offered a
sophisticated defense of the lobbyists' role in Congress's "compli-
cated, but organized, processes of interaction with other institutions
and groups, including executive branch departments, labor unions,
business organizations, and public interest groups."126  In the end,
legislators control the content of official documents. 127
124. Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 541.
125. Starr, supra note 27, at 377; see also Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1018-19 (1992). According to data from
the State Ethics Commission, the number of registered lobbyists in Maryland has increased
33% from 1986 to 1993. The number of entities with representation by lobbyists has in-
creased 76% over that period. Telephone Interview with Joann Rigby, Maryland State Eth-
ics Commission.
126. Breyer, supra note 27, at 858.
127. How effectively they exercise control is another matter. For some bills, the process
in Annapolis resembles the congressional process that Justice Breyer describes:
On important matters, staff members for legislators who are directly involved will
examine with care each word and proposed change, often with representatives of
affected interest groups or institutions, not only in the language of the statute,
but also in each committee report and the many floor statements. Significant
matters will again be brought to the attention of the legislators for development
of their individual positions, and for them to discuss and resolve with other legis-
lators. The process involves continuous interaction among legislators, staff mem-
bers, and representatives of those institutions or groups most likely to be affected
by the proposed legislation.
Id. at 859. For many bills, however, the General Assembly's helter-skelter pace makes so
painstaking a process unattainable. If a committee staff member or committee chairman
listens to only one side, the resulting documents probably will be skewed.
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By contrast, there is no legislative control over advocacy pieces
that wind up in a bill file. All testimony and letters lobbyists or other
groups submit automatically enter the legislative bill file, and thus be-
come part of the legislative history regardless of whether the chair-
man, members of the committee, or committee staff agree with the
contents of the testimony or letter. Indeed, some chairmen and com-
mittee staff may not even be aware that documents containing an inac-
curate description of a bill's legislative purpose or goal have entered
the file. At least in the federal system, interest groups must persuade a
Member of Congress to parrot a position of the group in the Congres-
sional Record, or convince committee staff to include the group's pre-
ferred language in a committee report, in order to elevate the group's
views to the status of legislative history.
Given the willingness of the Court of Appeals to credit such advo-
cacy pieces, a lobbyist need only paper the file with letters or testi-
mony in order to set up a future argument that those planted
characterizations of the issue reflect the legislative purpose or goal. A
particularly explicit effort to manufacture self-interested legislative
history appears in a memorandum from an advocate for interior de-
signers to the then Chairman of the House Economic Matters Com-
mittee. 2 The interior designers and the architects had fought a long
battle over whether interior designers could engage in space planning
(determining the location of interior partitions and the like). New
legislation about the practice of interior design was inconclusive on
the point because neither profession had enough political clout to
win a clear victory. In the memorandum from their lobbyist, the inte-
rior designers laid out an interpretation of ambiguous statutory text in
a way most favorable to their position, then stated to the committee
chairman an understanding that "it is your intent" to adopt the
interpretation. 129
This device can be an effective way of extracting an unfair gain
from compromise legislation. For instance, if a lobbyist wants X for a
client but lacks the votes to achieve X directly, the lobbyist could
adopt the alternative strategy of pushing for ambiguous language in
the bill. Those opposed to X might accept the ambiguity in order to
128. See Memorandum to Delegate Casper R. Taylor, Jr., Chairman of House Economic
Matters Committee (Feb. 21, 1991) (on file with the authors and in the file on House Bill
734, 1991 Session, in the Legislative Reference Library).
129. Id. at 2. The chairman of the committee subsequently distanced himself from the
interpretation in the lobbyist's memorandum. Letter from Delegate Casper R. Taylor, Jr.
(Apr. 8, 1991) (on file with the authors and in the file on House Bill 734, 1991 Session, in
the Legislative Reference Library).
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move the bill along, and then the lobbyist need only make sure that
the file contains a letter contending that the bill language means X
(even though the committee members might think quite otherwise),
and later argue in court that the bill's purpose was to achieve X, as
evidenced by material in the file. 3 ° Such a strategy might fail, for a
host of reasons, but why should a lobbyist not try it? Perhaps X will
seem to the Court of Appeals to be sound policy, and the existence of
the letter in the bill file will be just the bootstrap that the court needs
to reach its desired result. As Judge Posner has observed, "[b] uilding
up statutory meaning out of isolated and self-serving statements in
hearings or on the floor is one of the less edifying forms of judicial
formalism."' 3 '
B. The Oxymoronic World of Subsequent Legislative History
The Court of Appeals generally eschews after-the-fact accounts of
legislative purpose by individual legislators.' 32 Particularly as time
passes from the original enactment, postenactment statements will
simply reflect the "current preferences"' 33 of legislators, which
bear no necessary relationship to those of the enacting legis-
lators, who may have been reacting to a different constella-
tion of interest-group pressures. To give effect to the current
legislator's preferences is to risk spoiling the deal cut by the
earlier legislators-to risk repealing legislation, in whole or
in part, without going through the constitutionally pre-
scribed processes for repeal.13 4
Precisely the same is true when later bills on a subject are de-
feated. Whatever causes the defeat of such bills, the outcome reveals
nothing about the import of the original legislation. The defeat of a
bill neither repeals nor interprets existing laws.' 35 It is one thing to
130. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Statutoy Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 357 (1990) ("Rent-seeking ... private interests .. .will
often find it easier to insert evidence of private-interest deals in the legislative history than
in the statutory language.... ."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 445 (identifying the risk
that "judicial interpretation of a statute will be skewed by legislative history planted just for
that purpose").
131. POSNER, supra note 3, at 270.
132. Cf Kelly v. Marylanders for Sport Sanity, 310 Md. 437, 471 n.18, 530 A.2d 245, 261
n.18 (1987) (taking account of a legislative branch official's after-the-fact narrative discuss-
ing the process of enacting legislation as distinct from the purposes underlying the
legislation).
133. POSNER, supra note 3, at 279.
134. Id
135. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 418 (1967)
(agency rulemaking authority unaffected by Congress's failure to amend statute to author-
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infer a legislative objective from a committee's rejection of proposed
language in its consideration of the very statute before the court;1 6 it
is quite another to infer anything about a prior General Assembly's
purpose from a later General Assembly's rejection of proposed
legislation.1 7
In Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,' the central issue was whether
a claim for abusive discharge could be brought when the breach of
public policy alleged in the tort action (in this case, sex discrimina-
tion) could be remedied under the Maryland Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act.'1 9 A closely divided court held that "[the tort of] abusive
discharge is inherently limited to remedying only those discharges in
violation of a clear mandate of public policy which otherwise would
not be vindicated by a civil remedy." 4 ° Although the court based its
decision on several factors, this Article will focus only on the court's
buttressing of its conclusion through use of bills rejected by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
Even though the Fair Employment Practices Act did not specify
that its remedy was exclusive, the majority used rejected bills to con-
clude that the General Assembly intended to limit the remedy for em-
ize the rules); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (holding
that Congress's failure to grant the FTC injunctive power did not affect the FTC's power to
seek judicial injunctions); 79 Op. Att'y Gen. - (No. 94-025), 21:12 Md. Reg. 1018 (May 6,
1994) (agency authority to implement "family cap" limitation on welfare benefits unaf-
fected by amendment deleting "family cap" provision from welfare reform bill); 77 Op.
Att'y Gen. - (No. 92-026), 19:22 Md. Reg. 1963 (Oct. 30, 1992) (agency authority to
implement prescription drug discount program unaffected by General Assembly's failure
to pass departmental legislation conferring specific authority).
136. See Leppo v. State Highway Admin., 330 Md. 416, 424, 624 A.2d 539 (1993)
("amendments occurring as a bill progresses through the General Assembly fairly bear on
the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal," including omission of key language
from amendment); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 313 Md.
118, 125-26, 544 A.2d 764, 767-68 (1988) (stating that a committee's rejection of an
amendment "helps our understanding of overall legislative history, though it does not in-
fallibly indicate legislative intent"). But see Automobile Trade Ass'n v. Insurance Comm'r,
292 Md. 15, 24, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (1981) (amendment rejection theory "is a rather weak
reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent").
137. The Court of Appeals has recognized as much. See T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc.,
331 Md. 406, 421-22, 628 A.2d 223, 230 (1993); Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 735, 580
A.2d 176, 186 (1990); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87
MICH. L. REv. 67, 94-95 (1988).
138. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989). The case is discussed in Patricia A. Gillis, Limit-
ing the Tort of Abusive Discharge, Developments in Maryland Law, 1988-89, 49 MD. L. Rxv. 702
(1990); see also Daniel S. O'Connor, Note, Maryland Limits the Scope of the Wrongful Discharge
Tort Where Statutory Civil Remedies are Available, 20 U. BALT. L. REv. 290 (1990).
139. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (1991). The Fair Employment Practices Act was
enacted in 1965. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 717, 1965 Md. Laws 1043.
140. Makovi, 316 Md. at 603, 561 A.2d at 180.
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ployment discrimination to equitable relief, including back pay.14 1
The majority reviewed several bills in the 1976 and 1977 Sessions of
the Legislature that would have allowed the Human Relations Com-
mission to award compensatory and punitive damages.' 42 The major-
ity reasoned that because these bills were defeated, "the General
Assembly directly rejected compensatory damages for violations of
Art. 49B's employment provisions." 43
The dissent, however, took a different view of the Legislature's
motive for rejecting these bills. Relying in part on letters from oppo-
nents of the 1976 bill, the dissent argued that the bill's opponents
killed it because it would have curbed severely the Human Relations
Commission's administrative and investigative powers, not because it
would have allowed the commission to award damages.' 44 The dissent
concluded that the rejection of damages as proposed in the 1977 bill
might have reflected a reluctance "to allow an administrative agency
to award tort damages" but did not prove "that the legislature meant
to prevent the judicial award of damages." 14
The majority's approach read far too much into the defeat of the
proposed legislation. As the dissent illustrated, one often can attri-
bute a proposal's defeat to one or more of several possible objections.
A court indulges in policy-driven speculation when it assigns a reason
that happens to fit neatly into the court's analysis. Even if the court's
surmise about the reasons for the bill's defeat were correct, a later
General Assembly's sentiments are not law and do not illuminate the
objectives of the prior General Assembly that did make law.
The court committed the same error in Allied, Vending, Inc. v. City
of Bowie,1 46 where it held that the General Assembly had pre-empted
local government regulation of cigarette vending machines, thereby
preventing municipalities from restricting the location of the ma-
chines to make them less accessible to minors.' 47 The only pieces of
state legislation that could have achieved this pre-emption were cer-
tain licensing provisions enacted in 1890 and 1956, and a 1990 mea-
sure requiring the machines to display a notice about the illegality of
141. Id. at 623-26, 561 A.2d at 189-90.
142. Id,
143. Id, at 624, 561 A.2d at 189. The majority then went on to conclude that allowing
claims for full tort damages in discrimination cases "upsets the balance between right and
remedy struck by the Legislature in establishing the very policy relied upon." Id. at 626,
561 A.2d at 190.
144. Id at 642, 561 A.2d at 198 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. 332 Md. 279, 631 A.2d 77 (1993).
147. Id. at 282, 631 A.2d at 78.
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sales to minors. The pre-emptive effect of these provisions is arguable,
but surely inaction by the General Assembly in 1991 and 1992-when
proposals to tighten state law on minors' access to cigarette vending
machines were defeated-says nothing about the earlier legislation's
purpose, contrary to the court's suggestion that it did.148
Bills die in Annapolis for a host of reasons, some having nothing
to do with their merits. Perhaps the sponsor has done something to
anger the chairman of the committee with jurisdiction over the legis-
lation; perhaps some other provision in the bill is the real source of
difficulty; perhaps the bill gets caught up in a feud between House
and Senate committees, with each committee pressuring the other to
move legislation by holding unrelated bills hostage; perhaps time sim-
ply runs out.149 The rejection of later bills provides the court with no
basis for interpreting a statute before it one way rather than another.
The court's reliance on subsequently defeated legislation as a ba-
sis for conclusions about the meaning of previously passed legislation
might well discourage efforts to change the law. In the 1994 Session
of the General Assembly, two delegates introduced separate bills that
would have imposed restrictions on smoking in public places and
work sites.15 0 Some county officials who favored such smoking restric-
tions nevertheless sought to persuade the delegates to withdraw the
legislation. These county officials feared, with reason, Allied Vending
!--that is, that the bills' likely defeat would bolster the potential argu-
ment of the tobacco industry in a future lawsuit that counties lacked
the authority to impose their own restrictions on smoking in public
places.15 '
148. The court wrote: "The failure to enact such measures 'strongly suggests that there
was no intent to allow local governments to enact different... requirements.'" Id. at 304,
631 A.2d at 81 (quoting Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 493, 620 A.2d 880, 886
(1993)).
149. See Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 538 ("There are a hundred ways a bill can die
even though there is no opposition to it.").
150. H.B. 120 and H.B. 143, 1994 Session.
151. In order to allay the concern of the county officials, one of the authors, on request,
provided advice to the delegates on the issue. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack
Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, to Delegates Virginia M. Thomas and
Joan Pitkin (Feb. 10, 1994). The advice was that jurisdictions with police power were not
pre-empted from enacting restrictions on smoking in public places, and that defeat of the
proposed legislation would leave such local authority unaffected. Id. This letter of advice
was an effort to "inoculate" the legislative history against the type of misapprehension of
the meaning of failed legislation that Allied Vending exemplifies.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
This Article does not call upon the Court of Appeals to retreat to
strict textualism and join Justice Scalia's twelve-step program, Legisla-
tive History Users Anonymous. The problems that this Article has
identified can be remedied largely through a more thoughtful use of
legislative history.
The Court of Appeals should do in every case what it now does in
some: follow a disciplined methodology of statutory interpretation
that avoids unnecessary recourse to legislative history. The court
should always begin by teasing out the meaning that the text alone
most probably would have conveyed to the reasonable legislator. The
court should then test this apparent meaning by examining it against
its narrowest context, that is, by testing it for consistency with other
parts of the same bill, including the bill's title,' 52 any preamble,' 53 and
other substantive provisions.154 The court then should widen its in-
quiry further to include a limited consideration of the history of the
bill's language, that is, whether any changes in the wording of the
bill's relevant provisions as it moved through the legislative process
reinforce the court's initial hypothesis about the meaning of the
text.155 Next, the court should explain how the provision, under the
court's construction, would fit with related law, including other stat-
utes, relevant court decisions, and formally adopted administrative
agency interpretations.'56 If the fit is a reasonable one, the exercise is
over.
In other cases, when the meaning the court derives from particu-
lar statutory text alone is indefinite or seems not to fit within the con-
text of the language of the statute as a whole,' 57 the legislative
152. Every bill is to "embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title."
MD. CONST. art. III, § 29. Although a bill's title usually sheds little light on ambiguous
statutory text, courts can and occasionally do consult the title to clarify the scope of a
disputed provision. See, e.g., Mass Transit Admin. v. Baltimore County Revenue Auth., 267
Md. 687, 695-96, 298 A.2d 413, 418 (1973) ("That the title of an act is relevant to ascertain-
ment of its intent and purpose is well settled.").
153. See supra note 69.
154. See, e.g., Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 561-62, 644 A.2d 537, 540-41 (1994) (con-
sulting narrow definitions within the statute).
155. During this stage of the inquiry, the court may often be able to infer that the legis-
lators' rejection of given language indicated disapproval of its substantive import, not
merely its phraseology. See supra text accompanying note 47.
156. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132,
630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993) ("Context may include related statutes . . . ."). Professor Es-
kridge terms this approach "horizontal coherence"-that is, construing new provisions so
that they fit reasonably with the rest of the body of law on the subject. Eskridge, supra note
27, at 678.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 152-154.
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evolution of the statute's language,1 5 8 or related law,159 then the court
should turn to the legislative history. A clear sense of hierarchy
should guide the court's review of legislative history, with some ele-
ments of the history receiving more weight than others.'0
For all bills, we suggest that the court rely on General Assembly
documents that are most likely to reflect actual legislative purpose:
fiscal notes, committee bill analyses, and floor reports.1 6' If the court
announces clearly that these documents will carry the most weight,
legislators likely would pay more attention to what the documents say.
Then the reliability of the documents as reflections of legislative pur-
pose in turn would increase.' 62
Giving greater, and often determinative, weight to these official
documents will provide the added benefit of illuminating more spe-
cial interest deals. A legislator who formerly could work quietly to
transfer wealth to some favored lobbyist's client by allowing deliberate
ambiguity in a proposed statute and packing of the bill file with useful
material 6 ' might have to confirm the deal in the statutory text or a
committee document. Because naked greed is politically unattractive,
exposing it to legislative daylight is likely to deter some rent-seeking
and thereby serve the public interest."6
If a bill goes through the legislative process essentially un-
changed, the court should give significant weight to the views of the
sponsor. Likewise, if the bill is an administration bill, a departmental
bill, or otherwise clearly the product of an entity outside the General
Assembly, and the bill does not significantly change during the legisla-
tive process, then the views of the originating entity should receive
significant weight.165 If a bill is amended, then of course the court
should seek and consult a reliable explanation of the reasons for the
158. See supra text accompanying note 155.
159. See supra text accompanying note 156.
160. See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 636 (diagramming a hierarchy of congressional legis-
lative history materials).
161. The court should also, of course, set a document correctly within the legislative
chronology in order to avoid misplaced reliance on a description of a bill that was later
amended. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
162. The court should also make clear that it will never rely upon unsigned notes in a
bill file that might or might not be accurate and pertinent to what the legislators ultimately
passed.
163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
164. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REa. 223 (1986).
165. See, e.g., Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 370, 643 A.2d 906, 915 (1994) (citing
testimony of Governor's chief legislative officer to explain the purpose of an administra-
tion bill enacted largely as proposed); Board of Trustees v. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Corp.,
335 Md. 176, 200, 642 A.2d 856, 864 (1994) (giving weight to the characterization of a bill's
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amendments. To the extent that advice from the Counsel to the Gen-
eral Assembly describes the legal premise the legislation followed, that
advice too should be an authoritative piece of legislative history.
By contrast, the court should avoid citing testimony or letters
from individuals outside the General Assembly as evidence of legisla-
tive purpose, unless the court explains the basis on which it draws the
inference that such material reliably indicates legislative purpose.
The court should rely on only those advocacy pieces that the court
credibly can link to the Legislature's decision-making. For example,
the court justifiably could treat advocacy pieces as legislative history
when a committee document explicitly adopted the advocate's posi-
tion, or when advocates themselves proposed the language in ques-
tion and explained it in testimony (provided that the language did
not change significantly later in the process).166
The court also can map the rough contours of legislation by look-
ing at what advocates told the General Assembly. In this instance, the
court would not misuse advocacy as direct evidence of the statute's
purpose; rather, the court legitimately might infer that the General
Assembly probably legislated within the confines of the problem advo-
cates and others put before it. 1
6 7
The court should almost always decline to draw inferences about
the meaning of enacted legislation from failed efforts at a later session
to pass a bill dealing with the same topic. The one exception should
be that the failure of a bill written to overturn a court's or administra-
tive agency's prior construction of an ambiguous text may serve as
evidence of the General Assembly's acquiescence in that
construction. 1
objectives in a departmental memorandum when the department supported the bill and it
was enacted only "with immaterial subsequent amendments").
166. See Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Andrew, 318 Md. 3, 16, 566 A.2d 755, 761 (1989).
167. In United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993), the issue was
whether a statutory cap on noneconomic damages applied to wrongful death cases. The
court reviewed the bill file, which it described as "extensive," and noted that none of the
committee reports, task force reports, or individual statements contained any mention of
the wrongful death statute. I& at 546, 620 A.2d at 912. The court concluded that "[i]f the
General Assembly had intended that the cap statute apply to wrongful death actions, it
would seem that some indication of that intention would be present in either the language
of the statute or in the considerable legislative history." Id
168. See Life & Health Ins. Guar. Corp., 335 Md. at 195, 642 A.2d at 865. The legislative
acquiescence doctrine rests on the polite, albeit often dubious premise that the General
Assembly knows of agency interpretations and would amend the law if it were dissatisfied
with them. The court sometimes notes legislative acquiescence without any evidence that
the Legislature ever faced the issue of the agency interpretation. See, e.g., Sinai Hosp. v.
Department of Employment & Training, 309 Md. 28, 46, 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987). When
a bill to overturn an interpretation is introduced, at least the bill creates evidence of legisla-
19951
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Finally, the General Assembly must take some action as well. If
the Court of Appeals is to rely so much on legislative history, the Leg-
islature should safeguard it against manipulation, to the extent possi-
ble. Committee chairmen and staff should try to make bill analyses
and floor reports as clear and complete as possible. Beyond summa-
rizing the bills, these documents should identify and explain key legis-
lative policy decisions.169 The committees that do not routinely
prepare bill analyses and floor reports should do so. Otherwise, these
committees run the risk that eventually someone else's description of
their legislative objective will prevail." 0
The Department of Legislative Reference also should consider
tightened procedures for handling and safeguarding legislative files.
Under the present practice, the bill files that the Court of Appeals
reviews for evidence of legislative purpose are not secure until they
are microfilmed years later. With minimal effort, someone who is re-
viewing the file could insert or remove materials." 1 Documents in
the file should be date-stamped and perhaps numbered in order to
deter improper insertions or deletions. Those who inspect the files
should have to identify themselves and sign a register; some, but not
all, committees already follow this practice. Furthermore, anyone
caught removing documents from a bill file should face criminal
charges under the statute that makes it unlawful to "wilfully alter, de-
face, destroy, remove, or conceal any public record."172 The prospect
of three years in jail might give even the most zealous lobbyist pause.
CONCLUSION
The Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann has described the need for
"coarse graining" in physics-identifying the correct scale on which to
tive awareness of the issue, even if the reasons for the bill's eventual defeat remain
unknown.
169. An old format for committee reports might be revived. See, e.g., SENATE BUDGET &
TAXATION COMM., REPORT ON SB 825 (1976). This format encouraged the committee to
summarize the "purpose of the legislation," the changes that the bill would make in cur-
rent law, key testimony at the hearing, committee amendments, and "arguments support-
ing committee action." Id
170. For example, because the House Judiciary Committee does not prepare reports,
the Court of Appeals sometimes relies on reports of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Com-
mittee in construing House bills. See, e.g., Spratt v. State, 315 Md. 680, 685, 556 A.2d 667,
669 (1989).
171. Instances of file tampering are difficult to prove, but anecdotal evidence from peo-
ple involved in the legislative process suggests that documents have disappeared from a few
files. One entire bill file is now missing from the Department of Legislative Reference
Library (although it might have been misplaced rather than purloined).
172. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 45A (1992).
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observe, and so hope to understand, a phenomenon. 173 If one looks
at something at too fine-grained a level of detail, one might well miss
the basic process at work.
The Court of Appeals needs to be more "coarse-grained" in its
view of legislative history. To be the faithful investigator of legislative
purpose that it claims to be, the court should discard its fascination
with potentially misleading scraps in the legislative history and focus
instead on the clues that matter.
173. MuRRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR 29-30, 225 (1994).
1995] 465
MARYLAND LAW RE viEW [VOL. 54:465
0 ~ 0 0
U,0
-~ ~ 0
0 0 0C
0zuE ( 0 0
cl r. 0
0t.2
r 03 bO
0 ;a v 0
., s .,
.0- 0 WO O
ou c/ 0 .2 El .0 %
0 0 go 0
0~ ~ 0 -~
r..
0 0
r. X ~ .. E
- 0 ro o r"0- - - t
0 m
1995] No FAULT Au-ro INSURAN'CE 467
0 0 .5
00
o r.
4.) U..
0..) 000
4../)
~ 0(0
s 0"a 0
0 cd
QP 0~
.0 0~* 0 0
:w
0 0 o00
12 r. 10 0 0 -A. U : U U
0 ~ 4
0.
*0 0
m 4! 00
c v an 00 4, 00
cLO -~~ - ~ - -
- c- c- cc c -- 0 0 inc
(D Can -0 r- 0) 00e Fc
C-1 ~ 4 02 t- 0)~ f . 0 -WO 4
-"4 L) O XO ,-4 in) m in i C0 ~
-4 a
~~~~~~~ n CC)~ ~ o E~ o o
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
°-'
0
o
o
0
0
0.
..
0
2
0
Q
0
0
0
0
0
00
00
0
CD
c
'no
I~22
00
0
0
-54-
0
UC's
00
0
0
00
0
0.
0
0'
v
.0
0
0
C)
0
-0
00
0
0
¢U
0
00
-)
0
0)
0)
0 CoU-
Cd
0
0
00
0 - 0
.0
0
C's
o~
0
Cd
[VOL. 54:465
0d
0
t.'
0
X0
0
0
440
0
0
00
-
06
0 0
0
" 0
Q
00~
" 0
C',
InC"T
C4
to
4:
Cf64)
Cd
0
Z
0
0
0
C11
m
00
0
00
00
JU 1
0
-~ 0)
Co
~ 0)en
0
~) 10
.~ .~
C- -
~Co
1995] No FAULT AUTO INSURANCE 469
C4 o
Vt 0
00
W. 0 0
Mo.Lr'o - 0 0
10, 0 00~
v M
00 Q U .-0 ou 0 a "
E !i o V cd
0~ 0
az 0 -o ~ o ~
w- - u~ U 0 O 0 o-o
00 0 *c r
S - 0 0
U~~~ 91.I '
0.oR 0 00
o V0 00 r o
., IXo
r- C m a t C
02t E
Q0 0
C3
C4
C4 i
. 0
C4: Cq
an
OCd
0
o 0
00
0
0 0
0~
0-. 0
0. .
C'0 0 0
" .0
cn-
00C C'
[VOL. 54:465
0
PC.)
0
E
0
,..
0U
C)
E
o-
0
00
00
00
0z
00
0'4
SC'
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
1995] No FAULT Au-ro INSURANCE 471
0.
-0.0
00
0G . 0
CU -
> m U
~0 C,3 0 - U
00 0 r. t
M m c .V.
r U (M 0 0' in CU
ND. V4 CD
cl 0 0.) 0 C14 C a
an 61 2t ,w 0
U 0.)
C~ n Oen Coln C:
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
.0
0
0
R
0z
0
GD
44.
0
0
Css
on.
*0
C')
co
FEZ
.0
00.)
-Cis
0 U
lC.v
o~ E
US~
!21
0
0
E
0.
0
0 c
0
0
4.
0 C.
004
o
[VOL. 54:465
U,
0
u
a
00
C-
t.)
co
co
Cj
O )
472
X0
CIS
0~~
O~)
Co
0~4
C')
Co
'.0
-4
CO
O~)
0*)
'.0
C.-
C')
C')
CO
~ C'.)
